Daria Kuznetsova

The past three decades have witnessed a rapid global uptake of digital media. Does an increase in internet access lead to more anti-government protests globally, in both democracies and non-democracies? Has the role of the internet changed over time from benefiting the opposition to benefiting the regime? We use time-series cross-national data and negative binomial regressions to model protest data in 151 countries from 1990 to 2020. By leveraging change in the development of digital information globally, the results show that increases in internet penetration and mobile cellular subscription rates increase the number of anti-government protests in non-democracies in the period from 1990 to 2010, but not among a subsample of democracies. After 2010, increases in internet penetration rates did not affect the number of protests in either democracies or non-democracies. The use of cellular internet continues to have a small positive effect on protest frequency after 2010. We also test the government's internet censorship efforts as a mechanism for decreasing information access and diminishing mobilization. Results suggest authoritarian regimes modified their strategies over time, more effectively using information and communications technologies (ICTs) to quell anti-government protests using digital repression and information control consistent with the theory of informational autocracy.

What is the role of digital media in contentious politics? On the one hand, digital media plays a central role in informing the public and organizing political movements. On the other hand, it has become a valuable tool for digital repression in authoritarian states. This study concentrates on the patterns of digital media use by pro-government actors in times of nationwide protests in autocracies. It analyzes how pro-government actors establish control over political discourse and information flow online compared to pro-opposition and neutral actors. I argue that, following the increased use of social media by opposition actors during social movements, the state will seek to establish its presence online, attempt to reach larger audiences, and endeavor to frame political issues in a beneficial light to reinforce political control. I use the cases of the 2020–21 protests in Belarus and the 2022 anti-war protests in Russia and employ text-as-data computational methods to analyze communication patterns on public Telegram channels. The results show that pro-government channels in Belarus and Russia followed the protest paradigm and framed protests as illegal, unauthorized activities that cause chaos and disorder. The pro-opposition Telegram channels in Belarus reached a larger audience than pro-state or neutral channels. In contrast, pro-government and neutral channels in Russia dominated the Telegramsphere. These contrasting patterns of Telegram channel activity and popularity suggest that the Russian pro-government online actors are more sophisticated in controlling and manipulating the communication space than Belarusian pro-state actors.

Objectives. This study is one of the first to systematically evaluate the relationship between the Internet and social media use and participation in politics cross-nationally, in democracies and non-democracies. Most existing research on this topic analyzes one country or region. We contend that access to globalizing information networks—which exist within digital media space and where discussions of political norms and values are frequent—promotes higher rates of political participation. Methods. Using multivariate analysis and individual-level data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey with representative samples from 45 countries, we employ jackknifed samples to investigate the association between self-reported frequent Internet and social media use, our proxy for the exposure to globalizing information networks, and political participation. Results. Results show that more frequent social media use is associated with higher political participation, all else equal. This relationship is significant in democracies and non-democracies, suggesting that information networks increase political participation even in countries with Internet shutdowns, censorship, and limited rights and freedoms. Conclusions. Despite censorship, propaganda, and misinformation, the Internet and social media may help foster political participation across international borders.

The Internet of Things (IoT) has potential to deliver important benefits for IoT users, society and public good. How do citizens feel about sharing data from personal devices compared with “smart city” data collection in public spaces, with government and nongovernmental organizations, and across different situations? What predicts willingness to share their data with government? Through a nationally representative survey of over 2000 US respondents as well as interviews, we explore the willingness of citizens to share their data in various circumstances, using the contextual integrity framework, the literature on the “publicness” of organizations, and public value creation. Across different contexts, from half to 2/3 of survey respondents were willing to share data from their own IoT devices for public benefits, and 80%−93% supported the use of sensors in public places for a variety of collective purposes. Trust in government was significantly related to data sharing and support for smart city data collection. Yet government in the United States is less trusted with this data than other organizations with public purposes, such as nonprofits. Cultivating trust through transparent and responsible data stewardship will be important for future use of IoT data for public good.

The past two decades have seen an increase in internet use and the frequency of anti-government protests. Today, protests are organized via social media and messaging apps—digital communication spaces that enable easy coordination and information sharing. This ability of digital communication spaces to aid protest organizations poses a threat to autocracies, as popular uprisings are one of the main causes of regime change. This dissertation adds to the discussion on the role of digital communication in contentious politics, such as protests, strikes, and demonstrations, in authoritarian regimes. I argue that autocrats seek information control on digital communication spaces to minimize the probability of contentious political actions. By controlling the digital information space, autocrats can reduce information critical of the regime, disseminate disinformation and pro-government propaganda, and halt communication between protesters. The results show that as the use of social media as a source of news is positively associated with participation in contentious politics globally, pro-government actors in autocracies seek to establish control over digital communication spaces. However, the outcomes vary. By focusing on two cases of political contention in authoritarian regimes—the 2020-2021 protests in Belarus and the 2022 anti-war protests in Russia—and the messaging app Telegram, I find that Russian pro-government actors are more sophisticated in controlling and manipulating digital communication spaces than Belarusian pro-government actors. These differences highlight the dual nature of the internet and digital technologies that simultaneously enable collective action and provide opportunities for digital repression.